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SCALE software package has been used to model a ventilated concrete container for the dry storage of spent 
nuclear fuel. The methodology of calculations, which isused to substantiate the nuclear safety of dry storage, is 
described. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Handling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is one of the 
main tasks to be solved by nuclear industry of Ukraine. 
Nuclear power plantssafe operation becomes more 
problematic because of the limited volumeof SNF 
export in Russia for storage and own reactor storage 
poolsare overflowed. 
Nuclear power plants (NPP) in Ukraine lack 
capacity pools for spent fuel storage. For this reason in 
2001 the State Committee of Nuclear Regulation of 
Ukraine granted a license to operate the dry storage of 
spent nuclear fuel (DSSNF) facilityat the Zaporizhska 
NPP, which is the biggest in Europe with the total 
electrical capacity of 6000 MW. 
In addition, the SNF in the most countries with 
advanced nuclear industryis considered as a nuclear 
waste, which is stored without processing. However, the 
SNF contains a lot of fissile materials such as unburned 
235
U and accumulated 
239
Pu, which can be reusedlater. 
Therefore, building of DSSNF is the proper and 
considered decision. 
1. ADVANTAGES OF DRY SPENT FUEL 
STORAGE 
During SNF storing in a reactor pool their heat 
power and radioactivity are decreased considerably. The 
maximum heat power of a singlespent fuel assembly 
(SFA) is 0.99 kW. The SFA can be stored safely at a 
NPP site in special containers, which are providing 
effective heat removal from SFA and sufficient 
biological shielding of the NPP staff and the 
environment from radiation. 
Based on a comparative analysis of the possible 
ways of storing SFA at Zaporizhska NPP was chosen a 
temporary storage system, which allows to store SFA in 
ventilated storage casks (VSC) during 50 years. The 
VSC are installed on a concrete deck, which is located 
on the NPP site. This system is a variant of the 
temporary storage system, which is used at US NPPs, 
and is licensed US regulatory authorities  Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Such systems include 
container system of SNF dry storage VSC-17 and   
VSC-24 in which are stored SFA from nuclear reactors 
of PWR type. Despite the relatively short period of 
storage of the SFA in VSC-17 and   VSC-24, there is 
already a considerable amount of scientific and 
technical developments and operating results, which 
confirm that the long-term storage of SNF in such 
systems is safe. The first VSC was commissioned in 
May 1993 at “Palisades” NPP (USA). Canada, 
Germany, Switzerland, and United Kingdom have 
experience to store aspent fuel in the dry storage. 
The main advantages of the SFA dry storage 
technology are: 
 Safety, which is the main principle for the design 
and operation of the system. Protection of the 
population, NPP staff and environment are fundamental 
requirements. 
 All operations with fuel, including loading the 
storage container are performing inside the reactor 
building tominimize the potential possibility of the 
radioactive pollution. In addition, for loading containers 
with SFA is used equipment, which the NPP already 
has. 
 During storing of SFA in a storage pool for 
5…10 years (depending on the type and fuel burnup) 
decay heat of each SFA is reduced to 1 kW or less, that 
one allows to remove heat with natural circulation of air 
around the basket with 24 spent fuel assemblies. 
 Additional safety is achieved withstoringonly the 
hermetic SFA that had no release of radioactivity 
beyond fuel elements above prescribed limits during the 
operation in the active zone of the reactor and keeping 
in storage pool. 
 All SNFDS containers are stored at a NPP site 
that reduces transportation costs and additional 
guarding. 
The main quantitative design criteria of nuclear 
safety for the system of spent fuel handling is the 
effective multiplication neutrons factor value Keff < 0.95 
which is the same for normal operating conditions and 
design accidents. In order to load each container of 
spent nuclear fuel the Keff calculations are carried out. 
Calculations are performed using the SCALE software 
package. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCALE 
SOFTWARE PACKAGE  
SCALE is a modular system of standardized 
computer analysis for licensing, developed by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (USA) for the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (US  NRC) to perform 
criticality, radiation, heat transfer and burn up analysis 
[1, 2]. In this code, neutron transport equation issolved 
 by Monte Carlo method. All calculations in 
substantiation of nuclear safety of container loadings at 
Zaporizhska NPP are performed using the calculation 
sequence CSAS6, which is included in SCALE software 
package. This calculation sequence is used in the 
analysis of criticality and consists of sequential call 
executable modules CSAS26, BONAMI, NITAWL, and 
KENO-VI. The basic module for the calculation of 
criticality is code KENO-VI, for which BONAMI and 
NITAWL modules prepare multigroup cross-sections 
library for the compositions defined in the calculation 
model. 
The calculation sequence CSAS6 applicability for 
fuel of WWER reactors was substantiated in article [3], 
in which was shown that 44-group neutron cross-section 
library 44 GROUPNDF5 gives some overestimation of 
the calculated values of the neutron multiplication 
factorin compare with experimental data and was 
recommended for use in the criticality calculations. 
An analysis of the applicability of the package 
SCALE versions 5.0 and 5.1 for WWER reactor nuclear 
fuel was madein [4]. The analysis wasbased on 60 
critical experiments. It was shown that the calculation 
sequence CSAS6 for all type neutron cross-section 
libraries systematically underestimates the value of the 
neutron multiplication factor, therefore to get the final 
Keff  value code systematic error and error variance must 
be considered. Systematic error and variance for version 
5.0 and 5.1 package SCALE were defined in [4] for all 
types of libraries. 
Currently, to obtain a conservative estimate of the 
value of Keff  the following formula is used: 
          95 KENO KENO
2k k     ,   (1) 
where 
KENOk   Кeff value is calculated by code KENO-
VI; KENO  standard deviation. 
Formulas (1) gives the final value of k95, which 
cannot be exceeded at 95% of cases. 
The results of the Кeff calculations are processed in 
according with formula and the k95 final value is 
compared with the limit value 0.95. In articles [3, 4] the 
applicability of SCALE package for the criticality 
calculations for the nuclear fuel of WWER-1000 
reactors are substantiated. 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE FUEL 
ASSEMBLY AND CONCRETE 
CONTAINER 
The geometrical dimensions of the fuel assembly 
TVSA for the WWER-1000 reactors are shown in Fig. 1 
and are consistent with the data from documents [5, 6]. 
For intermediate storage of spent nuclear fuel 
assemblies ventilated concrete containers are used 
(Fig. 2). 
Twenty-four SFA are stored in the hexagonal pipe 
covers (guide channels) that are located in the 
cylindrical multiplace hermetic storage basket (Fig. 3). 
The basket is made of carbon steel. Multiplace basket is 
also a radiator for removing SFA residual heat into 
ventilated concrete container volume. Helium inside the 
basket forms and maintains dry inert heat transfer 
medium during the storage period. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Design of the fuel assembly type TVSA  
for the WWER-1000 reactor  
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of the VSC: 
1 – container cover; 2 – air outlet; 
3  hermetic basket storage; 4  coating; 
5 – air input and guide for transportation 
 
  
Fig. 3. Section of the hermetic multiplace basket  
for storage of the spent fuel assemblies 
The basket transportation within the reactor unit is 
carried out in a special shipping container that performs 
the following functions: biological shielding of staff 
who are involved in the transportation; basket protection 
against a mechanical damage during the transportation; 
protection of the basket outer surface from 
pollutionsource of which is located in the storage 
poolwater. 
The hermetic multiplace basket is placed in a 
ventilated concrete container, which performs the 
following functions: removal of residual heat from the 
basket; protection the basket from climatic, mechanical, 
and thermal impacts; biological shielding of thestaff, 
which is serving DSSNF; providing steady vertical 
position of the basket with the SFA during 
transportation and storage. 
Downloaded concrete container is placed on the 
special storage area that is located on the guarded NPP 
site. This area has own guarded boundary and performs 
the following functions: prevention of free access of 
unauthorized persons to the zone of radiative impact of 
DSSNF; stability of the transport and lifting tools, 
which are used in the transport and technological 
operations with containers; drainage of rainwaters from 
DSSNF. In general, DSSNF system is passive and after 
the concrete containers installation on the concrete 
deckfor storing does not require significant 
maintenance. 
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE FUEL 
ASSEMBLY AND CONTAINER 
CALCULATION MODEL 
The geometrical dimensions and material 
composition of structural elements of the SFA type 
TVSA of the WWER-1000 reactor, which are used in 
the development of the model and the calculations are 
shown in Tabl. 1. 
As an additional absorber the burned two  
component control rods (CR) are used in the container 
loading.  The CR dimensions and material composition 
are given in Tabl. 2 [7]. The CR top part consists of 
boron carbide (В4С) and the bottom part with length of 
30 cm consists of titanate dysprosium (Dy2O3TiO2). The 
bottom part of the CR for the model simplification is 
substituted with the tip from boron carbide with the 
same absorption ability. The absorber 
10В during the 
operation CR in the core is burned and in the model 
conservatively the burnup is taking account by reducing 
the В4С density of 25%. Thus, the В4С density at the 
upper part of the CR is equal 1.275 g/cm
3
, and at the 
bottom part is 0.161 g/cm
3
. 
Table 1 
 Description of the fuel assembly type TVSA  
for reactor WWER-1000 
Name of the element Value 
Fuel rod 
Height of the fuel rod 3530 mm 
Overall length of the fuel element 3837 mm 
Fuel pellet 
UO2, 
UO2+Gd2O3 
Outer radius 3.785 mm 
Center hole diameter 1.4, 1.5 mm 
Fuel cladding 
Inner radius 3.865 mm 
Outer radius 4.55 mm 
Material alloy Э110 
Instrumental tube 
Inner radius 5.5 mm 
Outer radius 6.5 mm 
Material alloy Э635 
Guide tube 
Inner radius 5.45 mm 
Outer radius 6.3 mm 
Material alloy Э635 
Stiffness angle 
Number 6 
The heated part length of the bunch 3530 mm 
Width 52 mm 
Thickness 0.65 mm 
Material alloy Э635 
Fuel assembly 
Type 
hexagonal 
lattice 
Lattice pitch 12.75 mm 
Number of elements in a lattice 331 
Number of fuel rods 312 
Number of guide tubes 18 
Fuel weight (UO2), kg
* 491.4  5 
494.5  5 
Enrichment, % 
For calculation 
4.4% 
*Value of the top and low fuel hole diameter 
The TVSA fuel assembly model based on the 
original data with the burned CR and discrete burnable 
absorber (DBA) rods for the SCALE software package 
has been developed. The head and bottom nozzle of the 
fuel assembly in this model has not been modeled, only 
part of assembly containing the fuel rods has been 
modeled. The TVSA calculation model diagram in the 
vertical cross-section view is shown in Fig. 4. 
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 Table 2 
Description of absorbing elements 
Absorbing element 
Absorber element B4C 
Outer radius 3.5 mm 
Density
 
1.275 g/cm
3
 
Composition, at.% 
10
B (19.8%), 
11
B (80.2%)  
Height of the absorber 3710 mm 
Height of the control rod 4240 mm 
Cladding of the control rod 
Inner radius 3.5 mm 
Outer radius 4.1 mm 
Density 7.8 g/cm
3
 
Composition, wt.% 
Steel (Fe-69.5, Cr-18,  
Ni-11, Mn-1.5%) 
 
Fig. 4. Scheme of calculation model of the fuel assembly 
type TVSA 
As one can see on the Fig. 4 the assembly 
calculation model is constructed from a set of fuel rods. 
The fuel rods length is equal 3837 mm; the hexagonal 
lattice pitch is 12.75 mm and the assembly full size is 
equal to 234.8 mm. 
The fuel rod upper part, spring and the bottom part 
are modeled in the calculation model as solid zirconium 
cylinders. The fuel rod and its calculation model are 
shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5. WWER-1000 reactor fuel rod: 
1 – top nozzle; 2  cladding; 3  spring; 4 – fuel pellet; 
 5 – bottom nozzle; 6 – zirconium solid cylinder 
Geometrical and material parameters of the 
multiplace hermetic basket and concrete container, 
which are used in the model, are presented in Tabl. 3 
[7]. 
Table 3 
Parameters of ventilated concrete container 
Element Parameter Value 
Concrete 
cladding 
Outer diameter 
Inner diameter 
Thickness 
Height 
Material 
Density 
3378 mm 
2007 mm 
686 mm 
5809 mm 
Concrete 
2.34 g/cm3 
Coating 
Outer diameter 
Inner diameter 
Thickness 
Height 
Material 
Density 
2007 mm 
1854 mm 
73 mm 
5200 mm 
10ХНСД 
7.9 g/сm3 
Container 
lid 
Diameter 
Thickness 
Material 
2184,4 mm 
57 mm 
10ХНСД 
Hex block tubes 
Outer diameter of the 
power ring 
Inner diameter of the 
power ring 
Block height 
Thickness of the power 
belt 
Material 
1625.6 mm 
 
1587.5 mm 
 
4320 mm 
19 mm 
 
10ХНСД 
Hexagon guide 
tubes 
Distance between the 
outer sides 
Distance between the 
inner sides 
Full length 
Fuel zone length 
Backend zone length of 
the fuel assemblies 
Heads zone length of 
the fuel assemblies 
Number of tubes 
Material 
259 mm 
 
249.6 mm 
 
4320 mm 
3530 mm 
425 mm 
 
270 mm 
 
24 
10ХНСД 
Shell ring of the 
basket storage 
Outer diameter 
Inner diameter 
Thickness 
Length 
Material 
1715 mm 
1664 mm 
25.4 mm 
4973 mm 
10ХНСД 
Power 
lid 
Diameter 
Thickness 
Material 
1651 mm 
76.2 mm 
10ХНСД 
Protective 
lid 
Diameter 
Thickness 
Material 
1657.4 mm 
241.3 mm 
10ХНСД 
To ensure the in dependence of the Keff  values from 
the boundary conditionschoice, the hermetic basket is 
 surrounded with additional 10 cm water layer on the 
sides and 22.7 cm at the top. This additional layer of 
water gives in the test calculations the same Keff value, 
both boundary conditions vacuum and mirror reflection. 
The full-scale model of multiplace basket and 
concrete container was developed for the normal 
operation condition calculations (Fig. 6). The concrete 
container and hermetic basket filled with helium which 
density is 1.78·10-4 g/cm3. The mirror boundary 
conditions on the concrete container outside are set up. 
 
Fig. 6. The concrete container model with the hermetic 
basket: 1 – concrete container; 2  lid; 3 – power and 
protectivelids; 4  coating; 5 – block of the hexagon 
guide tubes; 6 – the hermetic basket shell;  
7 – power ring; 8  SFA 
5. CALCULATION RESULTS 
The main requirement for nuclear safety is not 
exceeding Keff of value 0.95 for the normal operation 
conditions and design-basis accidents. 
All calculations for the nuclear safety substantiation 
of the DSSNF container loadings are performed with 
taking account of the fuel burn up. The isotopes, amount 
of which can be defined with sufficient accuracy and 
lifetime of which exceeds time period that is covered in 
nuclear safety validation are taken into account. Such 
fissile isotopes as 
235
U, 
238
U, 
239
Pu, 
240
Pu, and 
241
Pu [8] 
are considered. The minor actinides and other neutron 
absorbers are not considered in the burned fuel isotope 
content, which leads to additional conservatism. 
According to the height of fuel assembly the burn up 
distribution has significant non-uniformity. The upper 
and lower ends of the fuel assembly deplete less than 
the central part because of axial neutron leakage. 
Therefore, following conservative approachin the 
nuclear safety analysis, the burn up of fuel assembly is 
equal to the average burn up of assembly end parts. 
In the calculations is assumed that the container is 
filled by water with density of 1 g/cm
3
. 
A container loading pattern is presented in Fig. 7. 
For developing of loading patterns the following 
approach is used  the least burned fuel assemblies are 
located mainly in the center of container, and the most 
burned fuel assemblies are located in the peripheral 
rows. CRs are installed in the fuel assemblies located in 
the center and DBAs are installed in the peripheral 
rows. Such approach allows to form loading with a 
minimal number of CR and with aminimal Keff for 
normal operation conditions and to satisfy the 
Keff < 0.95 requirement for all accidents. 
 
Fig. 7. A container loading pattern 
The nuclear safety substantiation of the SNFDS 
container loadings consists of the next steps: 
 loading pattern determination with a minimal Keff 
value. 
Accidents analysis: 
 erroneous loading of a DBA rod instead of a CR; 
 erroneous loading of a fresh fuel assembly with 
maximum enrichment instead of spent fuel assembly; 
 axial shift of all absorbing rods at 10 cm that can 
be considered as modeling of container turnover; 
 displacement all SFA to the center of multiplace 
basket within the hexagonal tubes; 
 water levellowering inside the multiplace basket 
is modeling of water drainfrom a multiplace basket for 
subsequent drying and filling with helium; 
 calculation of the final Keff values isperformed in 
according with the formula. 
At the moment safety critical calculations for the 80 
containers loadings are performed in the Kharkov 
Institute of Physics and Technology with using the 
SCALE software package. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
The nuclear safety calculations of DSSNF container 
loadings are performed in accordance with a technical 
specification and based on SNF data, which are 
provided by NPP. The container loading pattern is 
chosenso that Keff < 0.95 requirement for normal 
operating conditions and accidents is meet. 
Technological tolerances, systematic and calculation 
statistical errors are taking into account too. SFA are 
loaded into containers with the necessary number of 
CRs and DBAs. 
Experience of performing the nuclear safety 
calculations shows that the calculation model is 
excessively conservative. First, it concerns the SFA 
isotopic composition, which includes only the main 
fissile isotopes [9], and the SFA depletion is taken as 
the average value between the upper and lower parts of 
the fuel assembly, i. e. a burnup profile is not taken into 
account in the model. Secondly, in the world at the 
legislative level by more flexible approaches to the 
substantiation of nuclear safety are approved. For 
example, if limit value of Keff for normal operating 
conditions is equal 0.95, then the Keff limit value is 0.98 
for accidents and for some type of accidents Keff must 
not exceed 1.0 [10]. This decrease in margin for the 
value of the estimated value of Keff to the limiting value 
0.98 (or 1.0) is associated with an increase in the 
accuracy of codes used for the substantiation of nuclear 
safety, and the use of more accurate neutron cross-
section libraries. Ukrainian regulations (for example 
[11]) need to be revised and updated to international 
level requirements in the field of nuclear safety. This 
will reduce the excessive conservatism and reduce the 
cost of SNF storage. 
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ОПЫТ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ ПАКЕТА ПРОГРАММ SCALE ДЛЯ ОБОСНОВАНИЯ 
ЯДЕРНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ СУХИХ ХРАНИЛИЩ  
ОТРАБОТАВШЕГО ЯДЕРНОГО ТОПЛИВА 
С.В. Черницкий, С.А. Солдатов  
Представлена модель вентилируемого бетонного контейнера для сухого хранения отработавшего 
ядерного топлива, разработанная для пакета программ SCALE. Описана методология расчетов, которая 
применяется для обоснования ядерной безопасности сухого хранения. 
 
ДОСВІД ВИКОРИСТАННЯ ПАКЕТА ПРОГРАМ SCALE ДЛЯ ОБГРУНТУВАННЯ 
ЯДЕРНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ СУХИХ СХОВИЩ  
ВІДПРАЦЬОВАНОГО ЯДЕРНОГО ПАЛИВА 
С.В. Черніцький, С.А. Солдатов  
Представлена модель вентильованого бетонного контейнера для сухого зберігання відпрацьованого 
ядерного палива, що розроблена для пакета програм SCALE. Описано методологію розрахунків, яка 
застосовується для обґрунтування ядерної безпеки сухого зберігання. 
